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Ability	of	the	IMF-CFF	to	Stabilize	Export	Earnings	
David	LIM*	
Finger	and	Dceosa	(1980)1	have	shown	that	the	International	Monetary	Fund's	
Compensatory	Financing	Facility	(IMF-CFF)	did	not	succeed	in	reducing	the	export	earnings	
instability	of	71	participating	countries	over	the	period	1963-1977.	In	fact,	the	IMF-CFF	
increased,	rather	than	decreased,	the	export	instability	of	35	of	the	62	participating	
developing	countries,	and	of	5	of	the	9	participating	developed	countries.	
Finger	and	Derosa	identified	four	features	of	the	IMF-CFF	which	could	have	reduced	its	
effectiveness	in	stabilizing	export	earnings.	The	first	is	the	repayment	schedule.	A	member	
can	draw	funds	only	when	there	is	an	export	shortfall	and	a	balance-of-payments	need.	
However,	it	does	not	have	to	repay	whenever	it	has	an	export	surplus	and	a	favourable	
balance-of-payments	or	reserves	position,	as	there	is	a	two-year	period	of	grace	covering	
the	second	and	the	third	year	after	drawing	funds,	and	as	long	as	repayment	is	completed	
within	five	years.	Export	instability	can	be	reduced	if	symmetry	is	imposed	on	the	conditions	
for	drawing	and	repayment,	and	the	latter	begins	the	year	after	funds	are	drawn	if	export	
earnings	are	good.	A	country's	foreign	exchange	can	be	increased	by	IMF-CFF	purchases	in	a	
bad	export year	and	decreased	by	the	IMF-CFF	repayments	in	a	good	one.
As	there	is	no	symmetry	requirement,	and	the	interest	charged	on	outstanding	withdrawals	
is	below	the	market	rate,	the	participating	developing	countries	which	have	only	limited	
access	to	private	capital	markets	have	every	incentive	to	delay	repayment	as	long	as	
possible.	For	these	countries,	the	availability,	rather	than	the	stability,	of	foreign	exchange	
may	be	more	important,	and	the	IMF-CFF	is	a	convenient	and	cheap	source	of	funds	for	
general	development	purposes.	
The	second	reason	is	the	formula	used	for	determining,	ex	ante,	when	a	country	has	an	
export	shortfall,	and	the	size	of	it.	The	formula	permits	the	use	of	provisional	data	for	the	
shortfall	year	and,	whenever	these	are	not	available,	the	use	of	estimates	for	up	to	twelve	
months.	It	also	uses	forecasts	for	the	export	earnings	of	the	two	post-	shortfall	years.	It	is	
not	easy	to	obtain	accurate	forecasts	at	the	best	of	times	and	it	becomes	even	more	difficult	
when	the	exercise	is	carried	out	for	countries	whose	export	earnings	are	very	unstable	to	
begin	with.	Most	of	these	would	not,	prima	facie,	have	participated	in	the	scheme	if	their	
export	earnings	were	stable.	If	an	export	shortfall	is	determined	for	a	year	of	export	surplus,	
and	a	withdrawal	is	made,	the	whole	exercise	increases	rather	than	decreases	export	
instability.	Even	if	the	direction	of	change	is	predicted	accurately,	the	size	of	the	export	
shortfall	might	be	grossly	understated.	This	then	produces	a	drawing	of	funds	whose	
stabilizing	effect	is	minimal.	
The	third	is	the	administrative	time-lag	between	the	export	shortfall	occurring	and	the	
receipt	of	the	borrowing	from	the	facility.	If	the	funds	are	received	a	year	after	the	shortfall,	
they	can	come	at	a	time	when	export	earnings	are	on	the	increase	again	and	produce	a	de-
stabilizing	effect	instead.	
The	fourth	reason	is	that	the	size	of	a	country's	quota	in	the	IMF	and	the	quota	limits	
imposed	on	IMF-CFF	purchases	do	not	allow	enough	fund	drawing	to	match	the	estimated	
export	shortfalls	in	every	case.	This	severely	limits	the	ability	of	the	facility,	even	ifit	does	
not	suffer	from	the	other	deficiencies,	to	cope	adequately	with	reducing	the	fluctuations.	
Finger	and	Derosa	found	that	the	inability	to	forecast	export	shortfalls	accurately	was	an	
important	reason	for	the	IMF-CFF	failing	to	reduce	export	instability.	Delays	in	receiving	
funds	and	an	inadequate	supply	of	them	were	found	not	to	be	important.	They	did	not	test	
for	the	influence	of	asymmetry	on	the	conditions	for	drawing	and	repayment.	
Need	for	Further	Empirical	Work	
Finger	and	Derosa	have	contributed	significantly	to	the	debate	on	the	ability	of	the	IMF-CFF	
to	reduce	export	instability.	However,	there	is	a	need	for	further	empirical	work	on	this	
issue.	Finger	and	Derosa's	analysis	covered	the	first	15	years	of	operation	of	the	IMF-CFF.	
The	results	for	a	more	recent	period	may	be	different,	especially	as	the	method	for	
measuring	the	trend	was	changed	in	1979	from	an	arithmetic	estimate	to	a	geometric	one.	
Moreover,	the	terminal	years	of	the	period	examined	by	them	may	well	be	exceptional	
ones.	The	very	sharp	increase	in	fund	drawing	from	the	IMF-CFF	by	developing	countries	in	
1976	(SDR	1,520	million,	compared	to	the	previous	maximum	of	SDR	300	million	in	1972)	
and	the	equally	sharp	increase	in	the	export	earnings	of	non-OPEC	developing	countries	in	
1976	and	1977	might	have	unduly	affected	the	results.	
At	the	same	time,	there	may	be	technical	errors	in	Finger	and	Derosa's	work.	First,	their	use	
of	the	standard	estimating	error,	obtained	by	regressing	the	natural	logarithm	of	export	
earnings	against	time,	as	the	instability	index	may	not	be	illuminating.	Some	scaling	is	
needed,	for	example,	using	the	mean	of	the	relevant	series,	to	avoid	the	problem	that	
differences	in	the	estimate	may	arise	purely	from	arbitrary	differences	in	the	denomination	
of	the	data	used.	Second,	they	obtained	the	trend	value	for	export	earnings	for	all	countries	
by	regressing	the	natural	logarithm	of	export	earnings	against	time.	No	explanation	was	
given	for	the	use	of	a	non-linear	function	for	all	the	countries	in	the	sample.	It	is	possible	
that	the	trend	values	for	the	export	earnings	of	some	countries	could	be	estimated	more	
accurately	using	a	linear	function,	in	which	case	the	estimated	trend	value	and	the	
subsequent	instability	index	would	give	a	false	picture	of	the	real	situation.	
A	further	analysis	of	the	impact	of	the	IMF-CFF	on	export	instability	was	therefore	carried	
out,	because	of	possible	weaknesses	in	the	Finger	and	Derosa	study.	The	period	covered	
was	1963-84.	The	analysis	also	deals	with	two	sub-periods,	1963-77	and	1978-84,	the	first	of	
which	coincides	with	the	Finger	and	Derosa	period	for	comparison.	
The	instability	index	of	export	earnings	adjusted	by	the	IMF-CFF	purchases	was	compared	
with	that	of	export	earnings	alone.	The	index	used	is	the	standard	estimating	error	from	
regressing	the	variable	concerned	against	time,	normalized	by	the	mean.	Both	the	linear	
and	the	logarithmic	functions	were	used.	The	results	are	presented	in	Table	1.	
When	the	linear	formulation	was	used	for	the	period	1963-77,	the	analysis	showed	that	
IMF-CFF	purchases	had	reduced	the	export	instability	of	15	of	the	35	countries.	However,	
the	reduction	was	very	small,	averaging	only	0.4	per	cent.	At	the	same	time,	the	export	
earnings	of	10	countries	were	actually	made	more	unstable,	while	those	of	another	10	were	
not	affected	at	all.	For	the	35	countries	overall,	export	instability	was	reduced	by	an	average	
of	only	0.1	per	cent.	For	the	period	1978-84,	and	the	entire	period	1963-84,	a	much	larger	
percentage	of	the	countries	examined	had	their	export	instability	reduced.	However,	the	
average	decrease	was	hardly	significant:	0.6	and	0.4	per	cent	respectively.	
		
More	or	less	the	same	results	were	produced	when	the	non-linear	formulation	was	used.	
The	majority	of	the	countries	drawing	funds	on	the	IMF-CFF	had	their	export	instability	
decreased,	but	the	actual	decline	was	minimal.	
The	results	suggest	that	the	IMF-CFF	was	not	effective	in	moderating	export	earnings	
fluctuations	in	the	participating	countries	over	the	period	196S84.	While	the	analysis	shows	
more	countries	to	have	had	their	export	instability	reduced,	when	compared	to	the	findings	
of	the	Finger	and	Derosa	study,	the	reduction	is	insignificant.	Thus,	in	spite	of	a	number	of	
weaknesses	in	their	study,	Finger	and	Derosa's	main	conclusion	for	the	period	1963-77	still	
holds	for	the	longer	and	more	recent	period	1963-84,	i.e.	that	the	IMF-CFF	does	not	
significantly	reduce	export	earnings	fluctuations	of	the	participating	countries,	
notwithstanding	the	change	in	forecasting	method	in	1979.	
Conclusions	
The	analysis	suggests	that	the	so-called	"judgmental"	approach	used	to	estimate	the	export	
shortfall,	in	which	forecasting	for	export	proceeds	in	the	two	post-shortfall	years	is	required,	
may	have	to	be	changed.	There	is	already	an	element	of	forecasting	involved	in	arriving	at	
export	earnings	for	the	shortfall	year:	when	hard	data	are	not	available,	provisional	figures	
are	used	or,	failing	these,	estimates	for	up	to	twelve	months.	The	whole	exercise	makes	the	
calculation	of	the	export	shortfall	extremely	sensitive	to	inaccurate	data	and	forecasting	
errors.	
Given	the	difficulties	and	inaccuracies	of	forecasting,	there	may	be	a	case	for	not	basing	the	
trend	value	for	estimating	the	export	shortfall	on	forecasts.	If	a	medium-	term	trend	is	
required,	then	an	exponential	or	linear	trend	value	can	be	obtained	by	regression	analysis	
using	data	for,	say,	the	last	5	years.	A	longer-term	trend	may	require	the	use	of	data	for	the	
last	7	to	10	years.	The	functional	form	which	gives	the	better	fit	should	be	used.	
There	is	every	chance	that	the	value	obtained	this	way	will	be	more	accurate	than	the	one	
obtained	by	the	current	method.	Even	if	the	results	are	not	better,	the	use	of	a	known,	
rather	than	an	"unknown",	formula	for	calculating	the	trend	value	enables	the	potential	
participating	member	to	be	more	sure,	in	advance,	of	the	amount	it	can	purchase	from	the	
facility.	This	would	be	an	incentive	to	make	greater	use	of	the	facility.	
Another	criticism	of	the	existing	system	that	can	be	raised	in	this	context	is	the	
inappropriateness	of	using	nominal	values	to	estimate	the	shortfall	in	export	earnings.	A	
country	with	a	shortfall	in	nominal	export	earnings,	but	no	shortfall	in	real	terms	because	of	
a	larger	proportionate	drop	in	import	prices,	requires	no	compensation.	On	the	other	hand,	
a	country	with	no	shortfall	in	nominal	terms,	but	a	shortfall	in	real	terms	because	of	an	
increase	in	import	prices,	requires	help.	
By	providing	compensation	on	the	basis	of	nominal	terms,	the	present	system	may	
therefore	lead	to	help	being	given	when	not	needed,	but	denied	when	it	is.	This	is	a	more	
serious	weakness	than	the	one	observed	earlier,	i.e.	that	the	facility	cannot	stabilize	export	
earnings	in	nominal	terms.	Even	if	nominal	export	earnings	were	stabilized,	real	export	
earnings	might	not	have	been	stabilized	at	the	right	time.	Thus	the	“real”	assistance	
provided	is	not	what	is	required	and	therefore	wasteful.	
The	failure	to	stabilize	the	nominal	or	real	export	earnings	of	primary	producers	would	
therefore	imply	that	the	IMF-CFF	has	not	been	able	to	neutralize	the	harmful	effects	of	
export	instability	on	economic	growth.	There	is	also	a	direct	cost	to	the	primary	producers	
concerned.	In	a	recent,	and	very	important,	contribution	to	the	literature	on	the	
microeconomic	analysis	of	commodity	price	stabilization	and	the	economics	of	risk,	
Newbery	and	Stiglitz	(1981)?	show	that	a	high	level	of	income	risk	can	be	very	costly	to	
primary	producers.	These	producers'	elasticity	of	marginal	utility	with	respect	to	income,	i.e.	
the	way	in	which	increases	in	their	utility	respond	to	changes	in	their	income,	was	found	to	
vary	between	1.0	and	2.0.	If	the	variation	coefficient	of	their	net	income	is	between	a	third	
and	a	half,	the	risk	premium	can	cost	between	5	and	25	per	cent	of	their	income.	
[Footnote]	
*Dean,	School	of	Modern	Asian	Studies,	Griffith	University.	Brisbane,	Australia.	
1.	Finger,	M.	and	Derosa,	D.	A.	The	Compensatory	Finance	Facility	and	Export	Instability.		14	
J.W.T.L.	1	(1980)	p.	14.	
2.	Newbery,	D.	M.	G.	and	Stiglitz,	The	Theory	of	Commodity	Price	Stabilization:	A	Study	in	
the	Economics	of	Risk.	Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	1981.	
